14 Therefore, the GFA, as a common and reciprocal redefinition of British and Irish public sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was a remarkably incomplete and unfinished constitutional process. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its border problem in Ireland show that the 1998 agreement did not go far enough to provide for an explicit, indisputable and constitutional (new) definition of the Dublin and London obligations as the sovereign guarantee of the agreement. According to the agreement, “the development of a peaceful environment… A standardization of security measures and practices can and should mean. 8 However, these cross-border institutional and economic agreements were an integral part and were based on a broader political compromise between nationalism and unionism. In exchange for such an open border with the executive`s cross-border cooperation institutions (Strand 2) shared between Belfast and Dublin, and in exchange for new power-sharing institutions in Northern Ireland (Strand 1), Dublin agreed to revise Articles 2 and 3 of its Constitution, explicitly supporting the principle of approval and abandoning its territorial right to Northern Ireland. Instead, it recognized the Isle of Ireland as a common territory and the right of the people of Northern Ireland to freely choose Irish and/or British citizens. Such constitutional reform had long been a great demand of the Northern Ireland Unionist community. At the same time, London and Dublin agreed that northern Ireland`s status could not be changed until a majority in the north and south of Ireland accepted such a change with two simultaneous referendums. The current invisibility of the soft Irish border and the absence of border controls are therefore endemically linked to the entire constitutional and institutional framework agreed in 1998.
Brexit Central (February 7, 18) – “It`s time to stop the damnation of the Irish border — the solutions are already there.” (Added 8 Feb 18). This article discusses “Smart Border 2.0” ideas (see UK and EU section) for a solution. (Added 8 Feb 18). Former British Prime Minister John Major has argued that Brexit could lead to a hard border, with the European Union and the UK having to control their borders for customs purposes.  The Conservative Party research group believes that the UK may have the choice of not controlling its border if VAT is not imposed or controlling the border to apply possible VAT on goods imported after Brexit.   The cross-border part of the agreement comprises 12 areas of cooperation controlled by the North-South Council of Ministers (NSMC).